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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
x Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
x Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
x Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
x Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
x Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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x Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
x Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
x Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
x Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
x Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
x Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
x Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
x Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Abstract 
The need for reform in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) acquisition and 
management of services acquisitions was recently highlighted by the Government 
Accountability Office and by the DoD’s top leaders in acquisition.  The for-profit 
sector also struggles with the effective acquisition of services in which the 
complexities and unique nature of services render the definition of requirements and 
the specification and measurement of contractor performance problematic.  Despite 
these difficulties, little research has been conducted to examine the determinants of 
sourcing performance in services acquisitions.  This study examines the 
relationships between service quality and its antecedents through the use of 
structural equation modeling.  Data were collected from 240 U.S. Air Force contract 
administrators.  Results suggest that requirement definition sufficiency and 
communication strongly affect service quality and regulatory and statutory 
compliance.  A negative relationship is found between the extent of compliance with 
regulations and statutes and service quality.  Other results include a significant 
relationship between the level of commitment by the internal customer and the 
sufficiency of the requirement definition, as well as the deleterious effects of 
personnel turnover on compliance with regulations and statutes.  The paper 
concludes with several managerial implications, limitations to the study, and 
directions for future research. 
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Over the past several decades, the United States transitioned from a goods-based to 
a services-based economy.  As of 2005, services accounted for more than 78% of the 
country’s gross domestic product and employed 80% of the country’s workforce (Coalition of 
Service Industries [CSI], 2007).  Federal spending on services has also sharply increased.  
The Department of Defense (DoD) obligated 212 billion dollars on service contracts during 
2009, an amount that accounted for more than 50% of the DoD’s contract spend 
(USD[AT&L], 2010a, b). 
Yet, the size of the DoD’s acquisition workforce has decreased in recent years 
despite these substantial increases in spend on contract services.  The DoD’s spend on 
services acquisitions in real dollars grew more than 100% between 2001 and 2008, 
increasing from 92 to more than 200 billion dollars, while the DoD’s contracting workforce 
grew only 1%, and the DoD’s total acquisition workforce shrank nearly 3% (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2009d).  The GAO contends that the DoD carried out this 
downsizing without regard to retention of specific skills and competencies needed to 
accomplish the department’s mission (GAO, 2007a), such as those skills required to 
manage increasingly complex service contracts. 
At the same time that demand for services has rapidly increased within the DoD, so 
have the demands on service contract administrators.  Some of this burden can be 
attributed to the uniqueness of services—the properties of intangibility, heterogeneity, 
perishability of output, and simultaneity of production and consumption which differentiate 
services from the acquisition of goods (Ellram, Tate, & Billington, 2007).   Because of these 
properties, it is more difficult to control quality levels, more difficult to evaluate quality, more 
difficult to manage service personnel, and more difficult to manage time, which is the 
process of synchronizing the resources required for service delivery with the time of 
consumption (Lovelock & Wirtz, 2007). 
DoD’s Service Contract Management Woes 
Recently, the GAO released a barrage of criticism of the DoD’s service contract 
management.  In 2001, the GAO labeled the DoD’s acquisition of services as “high risk,” 
stating that the department’s poor management of service contracts undermines the 
government’s ability to obtain value for the taxpayer’s dollar (GAO, 2001a).  It also 
highlighted the DoD’s difficulties in defining requirements, providing sufficient contractor 
oversight, and adequately staffing contracting professionals.  Another GAO report (2001b), 
reiterated findings concerning DoD deficiencies in service contract management and made 
three recommendations: appoint a Chief Acquisition Officer for each agency, improve 
training of the acquisition workforce, and increase the use of performance-based 
contracting.  To date, improvements in acquisition training and the implementation of the 
role of the Chief Acquisition Officer have not been fully realized (Falcone, 2010; GAO, 
2010b). 
In 2006, the GAO issued another report stating that the DoD still had not 
implemented a strategic approach to the management of service contracts (GAO, 2006a).  
Rather, the GAO found that the DoD was reactively managing its service contracts, due in 
part to a lack of information on service requirements, volume, and composition.  The DoD 
concurred with these findings and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) issued a policy memorandum to strengthen the 
management of DoD services acquisition (USD[AT&L], 2006).  This memorandum called for 
reform at the strategic and tactical levels to ensure services acquisitions were enhancing the 
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capabilities of the warfighter and achieving specific objectives such as the use of 
performance-based measures, contract action reporting, and regulatory compliance.  
Additionally, the memorandum implemented the changes required by Section 812 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, which required the DoD to 
establish a management structure for the acquisition of contract services. 
Despite these changes, the GAO saw little improvement in the DoD’s acquisition and 
management of services.  The DoD increasingly relies on defense contractors for business-
to-business services but lacks the key elements at the strategic and tactical levels to make 
service contracts a managed outcome (GAO, 2007a).  The GAO then questioned whether 
the DoD applies sound business practices to the acquisition and management of contracted 
services in: defining requirements, obtaining adequate competition, managing contractors in 
a deployed environment, assessing contractor performance, and executing interagency 
contracts and task orders (GAO, 2007b). 
Recent legislation passed within the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 
required the DoD to submit to congress an annual inventory of contracted services and 
required the Secretary of Defense to issue guidance providing for periodic independent 
management reviews of the department’s service contracts.  The DoD’s resultant guidance 
memorandum required contract “peer reviews” at the DoD level for service acquisitions 
above one billion dollars and placed the responsibility of conducting reviews within each 
component for all other service acquisitions falling below that threshold.  However, the GAO 
recently contested the effectiveness of these policies, asserting that the same pattern of 
service acquisition mismanagement still exists within the DoD (GAO, 2009c). 
The DoD has also been highly scrutinized for its lack of compliance with contracting-
related statutes and regulations.  Recent reports have highlighted compliance issues 
ranging from a lack of required documentation, such as determinations and findings for the 
use of time and materials contracts (GAO, 2007c), to issues meeting competition 
requirements (DoDIG, 2010a; GAO, 2004) and managing and definitizing undefinitized 
contractual actions (DoDIG, 2004, 2010b; GAO, 2007d, 2010a). 
But why is the DoD experiencing so much trouble with the acquisition and 
management of contract services?  For-profit-sector organizations are not immune.  Like the 
DoD, firms are spending increasingly more on outsourced services but resources dedicated 
to manage them have not kept pace (Ellram et al., 2007).  Additionally, overworked services 
acquisition personnel often use supplier-provided information to determine the cost structure 
and cost drivers of acquired services (Ellram et al., 2007). 
In order to improve the performance of service contract management within the U.S. 
Air Force, or the DoD as a whole, the determinants of performance need to be identified.  
Once this is known, leaders in public procurement can more effectively allocate resources 
towards those factors that have greater impacts and avoid the inefficient use of resources 
on those factors that have little or no impacts.  The objective of this research, therefore, is to 
address existing gaps in the literature and offer service contract practitioners a 
comprehensive model to improve the acquisition of service contracts while increasing 
compliance with federal, DoD, and Service acquisition regulations. 
To accomplish this, we first scan relevant theories to identify factors that should 
affect service quality.  We then combine the relevant antecedents into a structural equation 
model that explains service quality.    The remainder of this work is organized as follows.  
First, the study discusses the conceptual framework and proposed hypotheses.  Next, the 
study presents the research design and methodology.  Then, the study provides an analysis 
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of the proposed models and reports the findings.  Lastly, the study offers a summary 
discussion, including conclusions and implications. 
Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
Service Quality 
Quality is an immensely important yet fleeting measure for firm success (Anderson & 
Zeithaml, 1984) in that it is not easily articulated by service providers or by customers 
(Takeuchi & Quelch, 1983).  Services differ drastically in nature from goods—primarily 
through the four characteristics of intangibility, heterogeneity, perishability, and inseparability 
(Ellram et al., 2007).  First, the intangible nature of services renders specifications and 
customer expectations to be imprecise (Ellram et al., 2007).  Second, services are, by 
nature, heterogeneous.   This is especially true of services with a high labor content as 
performance will vary between providers and will likely differ between customers and with 
time (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985).  Like providers, customers also lack a 
homogenous definition of service quality for many specified services.  Because of this, and 
since consistency in levels of performance from service personnel is difficult to attain, the 
level of quality that a service provider expects to deliver may vary greatly from the level of 
quality that the customer expects to receive (Parasuraman et al., 1985).  Third, services are 
frequently perishable; unlike goods, services cannot be held or stocked in inventory.  
Whereas inventory policies for goods allow firms to buffer future demand with safety stock, 
service providers must change service capacity to meet demand fluctuations (Ellram et al., 
2007).  The perishability of services also presents challenges for inspection; service 
outcomes for many services can only be inspected or evaluated at the time of service 
performance.  For example, security guard services cannot be rendered for a previous 
period of time nor can the services be easily inspected or evaluated after a period of 
performance is complete.  Fourth, the production and consumption of services are often 
inseparable.  Quality in a service environment often occurs through interactions between the 
customer and the service provider (Lehtinen & Lehtinen 1982).  These interactions become 
even more influential to quality in services where higher degrees of customer input is 
required (Parasuraman et al., 1985), such as with real estate services. 
Parasuraman et al. (1985) developed a conceptual model of service quality based on 
gaps between perceptions and expectations of service tasks and quality.  The first gap is 
between the consumer’s expected service and the service provider’s perception of 
consumer expectations.  The second gap is the difference between the service provider’s 
perceptions of consumer expectation and the translation of those perceptions into corporate 
specifications for service quality.  The third gap is the difference between the corporate 
specifications for service quality and the actual service performance.  In the authors’ 
investigation, executives of service-delivery firms routinely stressed the critical function of 
service employees.  Therefore, the depth of this gap is contingent on the difference between 
the performance of the firm’s service delivery employees and the specifications established 
by the firm.  The fourth gap is the difference between advertized service delivery and actual 
service performance.  Finally, the authors conclude that the fifth gap, which is the total 
difference between the consumer’s expected level of service and the perceived level of 
service received, is, by design, a function of all earlier gaps. 
Parasuraman et al. (1988) empirically derived five dimensions of service quality: 
tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and empathy. Other factors shaping the 
customer’s expectations of service quality may include the customer’s past experience, 
personal needs, and word-of-mouth communications.  While the works of Parasuraman et 
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al. (1985) and Cronin and Taylor (1992) have significantly advanced service quality theory, 
their research has been limited to applications of service quality in business-to-consumer 
(B2C) contexts.  The five dimensions of service quality do not always fit B2B services due to 
many services that are either specified by the buyer or do not involve face-to-face 
interaction with service provider employees (e.g., aircraft maintenance). 
Regulatory and Statutory Compliance 
The government’s purchasers, administrators, and inspectors of services are tasked 
with ensuring compliance to the multitude of federal regulations and statutes collectively 
referred to as the Federal Acquisition System (FAR, 2005; Riddell, 1985).  FAR 1.102 states 
that the use of the Federal Acquisition System will satisfy the customer in terms of quality, 
among other objectives, as a guiding principle.  However, the U.S. Air Force and the DoD 
have come under much scrutiny regarding compliance with procurement regulations and 
statutes.   Not all cases of non-compliance are due to fraud, waste, or abuse; in fact, many 
cases are simply the result of unknowledgeable and inadequately trained personnel, an 
effect of large-scale increases in agency contracting without commiserate changes to hiring 
or training practices, termed “corruption by incompetence” by Cohen and Eimicke (2008, p. 
30).  Non-compliance with regulations and statutes undermines acquisition policy objectives 
and often thwarts those procedures established to ensure that the government receives best 
value for the taxpayer dollar.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that, 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the compliance with regulations and statutes, the greater 
the service quality. 
Requirement Definition 
Purchasers of goods and services must clearly define requirements (i.e., desired 
outcomes) to properly achieve acquisition objectives.  In the gaps model, one or more gaps 
exist between the buyer’s expectations of the service and the supplier’s interpretation of 
buyer expectations.  Since the supplier’s interpretation of the buyer’s expectations ultimately 
affects the level of service performance, the buyer’s perception of the quality of actual 
service delivery is largely dependent upon the alignment between buyer expectations and 
the supplier’s interpretation of those expectations.  Buyers of customer-defined B2B 
services often state service expectations in requirement documents that are incorporated 
into contracts. 
Within public procurement, Title 10 U.S.C. section 2305 requires purchasers to state 
government specifications in terms of function, performance, or design requirements.  
However, when acquiring services, specification and measurement of the required level of 
quality is often more complex than when acquiring goods (Brynste, 1996).  Recent reports 
have highlighted several instances of decreased acquisition outcomes due to insufficiently 
defined service requirements (GAO, 2002, 2007b, 2009d).  To address some of these 
issues, the USD(AT&L) has recently called for the strengthening of services requirements 
documents through the use of standardized work statements and the establishment of 
market research teams at the portfolio management level (USD[AT&L], 2010b).  Even with 
these additional tools, the added complexity of differing interpretations of requirements 
documents by the buyer and supplier renders the exact communication of the contents of 
the service and desired service level to be nearly impossible.  Without a complete 
understanding of the buyer’s service requirement, a supplier may not perform tasks that the 
government expects to receive under the terms of the contract, may not meet the buyer’s 
expectations in terms of function, performance, and quality, or may not perform those 
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functions necessary for the contract to adhere to regulations, statutes, and policy.  
Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a direct, positive relationship between sufficiency of the 
requirement definition and service quality. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a direct, positive relationship between the sufficiency of 
the requirement definition and regulatory and statutory compliance. 
Recent literature has indicated that an early involvement of suppliers into supply 
chains may produce positive outcomes for both buyers and suppliers (see, for example, 
Handfield, Ragatz, Petersen, & Monczka, 1999; Seshadri, 2005).  Bricoe, Dainty, Millett, and 
Neal (2004) found that the early involvement of suppliers resulted in increased integration 
into the supply chain, improvements to schedule, and a better understanding of client needs 
and objectives.  With respect to services acquisitions, Briscoe et al.’s (2004) conclusion 
represents a logical outcome as purchasing organizations step away from an introverted 
approach to procurement planning and capitalize on the expertise of suppliers who are often 
more experienced and knowledgeable in their respective industries than the purchasing 
organization’s buyers.  As such, 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the extent the contractor defines requirements, the greater 
the service quality. 
Hypothesis 5: The greater the extent the contractor defines requirements, the greater 
the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
Relational Exchange 
Relational Contract Theory was introduced by Macneil (1980), who contended that 
relationships, rather than discrete transactions, are at the core of contracts.  Morgan and 
Hunt (1994) developed the Commitment-trust Theory for relational marketing whereby 
commitment and trust are central because they encourage marketers to work towards 
preserving investments in relationships through cooperation, favor beneficial long-term 
partnerships over short-term, volatile pacts, and consider higher-risk endeavors without fear 
of partners acting in opportunistic manners.  Commitment is a long-term desire to maintain a 
relationship which is considered to be important or valuable while trust is a reflection of 
willingness to depend on a business partner.  In Morgan and Hunt’s model, communication 
is a precursor to trust which ultimately results in successful relational exchanges between 
parties by providing a mechanism for partners to resolve disputes, align their expectations 
and perceptions, and jointly develop strategies (Wittmann, Hunt, & Arnett, 2009). 
Two of the procurement theories explaining firm governance are relational exchange 
and transaction cost economics (TCE).  TCE theory suggests that activities will be 
outsourced when transaction costs are lower than the cost of performing the work in-house 
(Williamson, 1975).  Transaction costs of contracting in the market include the costs of 
writing and negotiating contracts and the costs of monitoring suppliers—actions needed to 
thwart supplier opportunism.  Relational exchange offers a more efficient alternative to 
governing suppliers than detailed contracts and oversight.  By establishing trust and 
commitment, suppliers need not be monitored as closely nor does the contract need to be 
written as thoroughly.  After all, even the most thorough contracts cannot possibly cover all 
contingencies.  Numerous positive effects of relational exchange include increased 
cooperation (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), reduced opportunism (Brown, Dev, & Lee, 2000; Joshi 
& Stump, 1999), increased performance (Skarmeas, Katsikeas, & Schlegelmilch, 2002), and 
increased satisfaction and service quality (Paulin, Perrien, & Ferguson, 1997).  Therefore, 
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given the centrality of relational exchange, any study of B2B exchange should include the 
effects of relational norms. 
When contracting for services, proper communication between a services purchaser, 
contractor, and end user is critically important to handle variations or unforeseen events in 
service delivery (Bryntse, 1996).  Cohen and Eimicke (2008) include several forms of 
government-contractor communication problems among their list of top issues within public 
procurement.  First, they argue that poor communication between the government and the 
contractor’s management team often produces an unacceptable level of performance and 
causes conflicts between the parties, particularly when communication issues result in 
poorly defined tasks or when projects fail.  Similarly, they reason that communication issues 
between the government and the contractor’s employees may result in employee confusion 
regarding direction on tasks or assignments.  In these situations, the contractor’s employees 
are often forced to establish direction and solve problems internally, which may result in 
methods or levels of performance that do not match the government’s expectations.  In 
parallel with this line of reasoning, inadequate communication between the government and 
the contractor’s employees may result in undesirable contractor performance on those 
actions required to ensure compliance with the government’s procurement policies.  Kong 
and Mayo (1993) emphasize the need for supply chain members to integrate (i.e., high 
involvement and frequency of contact) the respective functional areas of each firm in order 
to minimize gaps and maximize service levels to the end consumer.  Likewise, they also 
warn that where buyer-supplier interfaces are constrained (i.e., cross-functional, cross-
organizational, dialogue is controlled or stymied), gaps in service delivery will occur.  This is 
logical—particularly where requirements documents inadequately define expectations and 
needs.  Where specifications are vague, communication can fill the void.  As such,  
Hypothesis 6: The greater the communication between the government and the 
contractor, the greater the service quality. 
Hypothesis 7: The greater the communication between the government and the 
contractor, the greater the regulatory and statutory compliance. 
Agency Theory 
In agency theory, the agency relationship is defined as an agreement in which at 
least one person, the principal, delegates duties and some decision-making authority to 
another, the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the 
agency problem as the likelihood that the agent will not act in the interest of the principal if 
both parties seek to maximize their utility.  Eisenhardt (1989) asserts that two fundamental 
problems may occur in principal-agent relationships. The first problem will ensue when the 
principal and agent have conflicting goals and it is either difficult or expensive for the 
principal to monitor the agent.  The second problem occurs when the principal and agent 
have different attitudes towards accepting risk.  The principal can limit actions by the agent 
that are misaligned with the principal’s interests by expending additional resources on 
monitoring the agent, by offering incentives, or by paying for the agent’s bonding.  
Therefore, the cost of the agency relationship is the sum of these three actions by the 
principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Within public procurement, a misalignment of interests between the government 
(principal) and a contractor (agent) is typically identified through the use of surveillance 
methods, often termed quality assurance.  Surveillance is necessary to ensure service 
quality in public procurements (Lam, 2008).  Service quality is as dependent on post-award 
management of performance as it is on pre-award specification of service requirements and 
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source selection (Axelsson & Wynstra, 2002).  Despite this, the GAO found that contracting 
activities within the DoD typically place a far greater emphasis on awarding service contracts 
than on ensuring that trained and knowledgeable quality assurance personnel are assigned 
prior to contract award (GAO, 2005a).  The GAO also reports that these actions reduce the 
government’s ability to assure that service suppliers are providing timely and quality services 
and mitigating performance problems.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 8: The greater the amount of government surveillance of contractor 
performance, the greater the service quality. 
The federal government and the DoD prescribe performance-based services 
acquisition (PBSA) procedures to address agency problems which occur in the acquisition of 
services.  Most notably, PBSA promotes the procurement of commercial services and 
promotes contractor innovations through the use of outcome-based requirement definitions, 
as opposed to requirement definitions that specify the inputs and tasks necessary for 
performance (USD[AT&L], 2000).  The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) 
enumerated four requirements which, at a minimum, must be included in a service contract 
for the proper implementation of PBSA procedures: an outcome-based requirement 
definition, performance standards that are tied to requirements, a government-developed 
plan for monitoring contractor performance against performance standards, and, when 
appropriate, positive and negative performance incentives (OFPP, 1997).  Although the DoD 
has had some issues fully implementing PBSA procedures (see, for example, Ausink, 
Baldwin, Hunter, & Shirley, 2002; GAO, 2002b), the use of PBSA in public procurement has 
been linked to improved acquisition outcomes, most notably reduced cost and improved 
performance (OFPP, 1998).  As such, 
Hypothesis 9: The greater extent to which performance-based services acquisition 
procedures are used, the greater the service quality. 
Resource-Based View of the Firm 
The resource-based view of the firm states that a firm’s competitive advantage in the 
marketplace is based on its ability to acquire and maintain valuable resources important to 
production (Connor, 1991). Resources are a firm’s physical capital, human capital, and 
organizational capital that improve efficiency or effectiveness (Barney, 1991).  For a firm to 
build a sustained competitive advantage, defined as a competitive advantage that lasts a 
long period of time (Jacobsen, 1988), firms must possess resources that are rare, valuable, 
imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable by other resources that are valuable but neither 
rare nor imperfectly imitable (Barney, 1991).  
In terms of the acquisition of services in the U.S. Air Force, alliance resources 
include acquisition personnel and the time allotted for those personnel to perform all of the 
functions necessary for the acquisition of the service. First, the sufficiency of the 
procurement lead-time varies between procurements.  The length of this period may 
determine how well the requirement is defined, the amount or depth of market research that 
is performed, the appropriateness of the acquisition strategy, and the ability of the 
contracting activity to comply with applicable directives such as advertising requirements, 
competing requirements, applying appropriate socio-economic strategies (e.g., set-asides), 
documenting determinations and findings, and conducting solicitation and contract reviews. 
As such, it is posited that, 








Hypothesis 11: The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater the 
compliance with regulations and statutes. 
Hypothesis 12: The greater the sufficiency of procurement lead-time, the greater the 
sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
As a resource in the purchaser-supplier alliance, the assignment of an adequate 
number of personnel to perform contract award and administration functions is crucial to the 
acquisition’s overall success.  Recent reports by the DoD Inspector General highlighted 
issues resulting from insufficient manpower and increased turnover due to acquisition 
workforce reductions (DoDIG, 2000a, 2000b, 2003). Several key areas in which problems 
were noted include increased program costs, reduced scrutiny and timeliness in reviewing 
acquisition actions, lost opportunities to develop cost-saving initiatives, insufficient staff to 
manage requirements, and increased backlogs in closing out completed contracts (DoDIG, 
2000a).  In particular, the excessive turnover of acquisition personnel threatens the long-
term success of acquisitions as government administration functions that are required by 
contract terms, regulations, or statutes may not be properly accomplished (Office of the 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction [SIGIR], 2008).  Research has generally 
supported the deleterious effects of high levels of employee turnover on organizational 
performance (Glebbeek & Bax, 2004; Huselid, 1995).  Schlesinger and Heskett (1991) 
asserted that high employee turnover in service organizations results in long-term decreases 
in sales and profitability as well as in lower levels of service quality.  Therefore, it is posited 
that: 
Hypothesis 13: The greater the turnover of government acquisition personnel, the 
lesser the service quality. 
Hypothesis 14: The greater the turnover of government acquisition personnel, the 
lesser the compliance with regulations and statutes. 
Competence-Based View of the Firm 
The competence-based view provides that competitive advantage is a function of the 
firm’s core competencies.  A core competence represents the collective learning in an 
organization (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).  Econom (2006) argues that federal agencies must 
consider contract management as a core competency since the functions performed by 
third-party contractors are often essential in successfully achieving organizational goals and 
concludes that the success of the buying organization is largely dependent on hiring 
personnel who possess the right mix of skills, abilities, experience, and training.  The right 
mix of skills is critical to achieving contract performance outcomes (United States Merit 
Systems Protection Board, 2005).  Within services acquisition, education, training, and 
experience are enablers for the purchasing organization to effectively deploy assets to 
achieve acquisition objectives.  Those individuals with the greatest breadth of education, 
training, and experience may be capable of effectively purchasing and administering a wider 
range of service contracts.  While the development of knowledge may be a result of broad-
based practical and educational exposure, experience is often a function of time spent 
performing tasks.  Purchaser education may be reflected by the attainment of degrees or 
professional certifications.  The level of training of the federal acquisition workforce is 
measured using the Acquisition Professional Development Program (APDP), which offers 
three levels of certifications in several areas of acquisition based on completion of training 
courses and modules, on-the-job experience (time), and level of education.  In practice, 
federal acquisition personnel who demonstrate a capability for increased responsibility 
through competencies of education, training, and work experience may be assigned to 
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award or administer acquisitions that are more complex, requiring compliance with 
increased numbers of regulations and statutes.  As such, 
Hypothesis 15: There will be a direct, positive relationship between the amount of 
contract administrator experience and the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
Hypothesis 16: There will be a direct, positive relationship between the amount of 
contract administrator experience and regulatory and statutory compliance. 
Hypothesis 17: The greater the contract administrator’s APDP certification level, the 
greater the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
Hypothesis 18: The greater the contract administrator’s APDP certification level, the 
greater the regulatory and statutory compliance. 
Hypothesis 19: The greater the contract administrator’s education level, the greater 
the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
Hypothesis 20: The greater the contract administrator’s education level, the greater 
the regulatory and statutory compliance. 
Internal Customer Commitment 
The many roles of the internal customer are critical to the success of a supply chain 
throughout the lifecycle.  The internal customer often provides the necessary funding to 
acquire the service.  This level of funding may permit the use of certain performance-based 
incentives if appropriate for the contractual action.  Second, the internal customer plays an 
integral role in the generation of requirement documents such as the statement of work.  
Third, the internal customer must devote manpower to the services acquisition for: (1) the 
evaluation of offers throughout the source selection process, (2) the performance of quality-
assurance, and (3) for management of the requirement to include contract-change requests, 
development of past performance information, and the determination of performance-based 
incentive awards.  This level of manpower is often based on manpower standards which 
allocate full-time positions based on the number of contracts that a unit manages, among 
other factors (Reed, 2010; U.S. Air Force, 2001).  In such a situation, the assignment of 
available personnel against contracts within a unit’s portfolio would be an indication of the 
level of commitment to each acquisition. Without an acceptable level of commitment from 
the internal customer to properly conduct the acquisition, adequate standards for the level of 
service quality may not be established and the contract may not be effectively managed 
after award.  As such, 
Hypothesis 21: The greater the internal customer’s commitment to the service 
acquisition, the greater the compliance with regulations and statutes. 
Hypothesis 22: The greater the internal customer’s commitment to the service 
acquisition, the greater the sufficiency of the requirement definition. 
Methodology 
This study employed a mixed design (Creswell, 2003) of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis in order to provide a more accurate and holistic perspective of the phenomena 
(Boyer & Swink, 2008).  The qualitative work involved discussions with academicians and 
practitioners to ensure the proposed model achieved face validity and used valid measures 
of constructs.  Next, the research employed structural equation modeling using cross-
sectional survey data in order to test the hypotheses (see Figure 1).  The remainder of this 
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section details the survey development, the sample, data collection, and reliability and 
validity. 
Questionnaire Design and Construct Measurement 
Survey items were assessed on a seven-point Likert-type scale.  The latent 
constructs were measured using or adapting existing scales of established validity.  Scales 
were not available for the sufficiency of the requirement definition and the sufficiency of lead 
time; thus, we created them based on our dialogue with practitioners. 
 
Figure 1. Path Diagram of Hypothesized Structural Model 
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An online survey was used to collect the data.  Because it is difficult to identify 
personnel who manage service contracts, an invitation was forwarded via e-mail to eligible 
individuals through supervisors of U.S. Air Force contracting units.  Of the 60 units invited to 
participate in the study, 42 units agreed and distributed the survey to 743 personnel who 
administer service contracts.  Of the 743 potential participants, 252 individuals responded, 
yielding a 34% response rate, which is consistent with rates reported for web-based surveys 
(Larson, 2005).  Within these responses, 12 were later discarded due to missing, faulty, or 
inconsistent responses.   
From the 240 usable responses, the average respondent was 41.7 years old and 
had 11.7 years of sourcing experience.  The gender of respondents was nearly even, with 
males accounting for 51.9% of respondents and females accounting for 48.1% of 
respondents.  Respondents had a diverse range of educational experience, with the highest 
level of education for 11.9% of respondents being a high school diploma or general 
equivalency diploma, the highest level of education for 12.3% of respondents being an 
associate’s degree, the highest level of education for 43.2% of respondents being a 
bachelor’s degree, and the highest level of education for 31.7% of respondents being a 
master’s degree. Only two respondents, or 0.8%, held a doctoral or professional degree.  
Additionally, a wide range of types of services was represented. 
Reliability and Validity 
Through iterative scale purification (Churchill, 1979), 43 survey items reduced to 26 
across the seven latent factors.  Composite reliabilities (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), ranging 
from 0.76 to 0.96, exceeded the minimum acceptable threshold of 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978) 
providing evidence of reliability.  Construct validity was assessed through confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) using structural equation modeling in Mplus version 6.0.  Separate models 
were run for exogenous and endogenous constructs (Byrne, 2010).  Covariances were used 
as input data.  All loadings were significant at the 0.05 level, and their standard errors were 
not abnormal.  No standardized loadings exceeded 1.0, and no negative error variances 
(Heywood Case) occurred.  The chi square test was not significant for the exogenous 
measurement model ( F 2 (48) = 52.72, p < .30), but was significant ( F 2 (75) = 127.63, p < 
.001) for the endogenous model indicating a difference between the hypothesized 
endogenous model and the data.  However, a global assessment (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988) of 
the various goodness of fit indices indicated good fit.  The values for CFI (1.00 exogenous; 
0.98 endogenous) and TLI (1.00 exogenous; 0.98 endogenous) are both higher than the 
0.95 minimums (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010), suggesting good fit.  Similarly, the 
RMSEA (0.02 exogenous; 0.06 endogenous) and Standard Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR; 0.03 exogenous; 0.03 endogenous) values are less than the thresholds proposed 
by Hair et al. (2010), who recommended maximum values of 0.08 each.  The models 
demonstrated solid fit indices and statistically significant path coefficients loading on the 
intended factors, indicative of convergent validity (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988).  The average 
variance extracted (AVE) by each construct exceeded the 0.50 standard demonstrating 
convergent validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). We then compared each AVE to the variance 
shared between constructs.  None of the shared variances approached the AVE, providing 
sufficient evidence that the constructs were indeed unique (Lam, Shankar, & Murthy, 2004).  
We tested for nonresponse bias using Armstrong & Overton’s (1977) approach.  Tests for 
differences in three latent constructs and two demographic variables revealed no significant 
differences, indicating a lack of response bias in the data. 
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The SEM model was fitted to the data; Table 1 displays the results.  We used Mplus 
software to compute maximum likelihood estimations of parameter values based on the 
variance/covariance matrix.  We assessed several fit indices including those suggested by 
Bagozzi and Yi (1988), Bentler (1992), and Hair et al. (2010). While the chi square statistic 
was significant (Ȥ2(404 d.f.) = 532.26, p < .001), a global assessment of alternative fit indices 
supports the model.  The SRMR of 0.05 is lower than the 0.08 threshold (Hair et al., 2010).  
Additionally, the ratio of chi squared-to-degrees of freedom (1.32) is lower than the standard 
of two (Carmines & McIver, 1981), further suggesting a good fit.  The values for CFI (0.97) 
and TLI (0.97) are both higher than the 0.95 minimums (Hair et al., 2010), suggesting good 
fit.  Table 1 displays the results of the structural equation model.  The determinants 
examined in the model explain 30% of the variance in the sufficiency of the requirement 
definition and 66% of the variance in service quality. 
In the interest of achieving a more parsimonious model (see Figure 2), paths with 
nonsignificant relationships were removed.  The chi-square value of 360.61 is significant 
with a p-value of less than 0.001.  While this suggests that fit may be less than adequate, 
the relative chi-square value is 1.41 and less than the 3.00 recommended threshold, 
indicating good fit to the sample data.  As before, a global assessment of fit was also 
performed using CFI, TLI, RMSEA, and SRMR because the chi-square test is not 
representative of higher order models and tends to penalize for complexity and larger 
samples.  The values for CFI and TLI are both higher than the 0.95 minimums that were 
proposed by Hair et al. (2010), suggesting good fit.  Similarly, the RMSEA and SRMR values 
of 0.04 and 0.06 are less than the thresholds proposed by Hair et al. (2010), who 
recommend maximum values of 0.08 each.  Overall, the trimmed structural model appears 
to fit well to the sample data. 
 
Figure 2. Trimmed Model 
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A review of the standardized path and loading estimates reveals all loadings to be 
significant with p-values less than 0.001.  Additionally, path estimates for all hypothesized 
relationships are either significant with a p-value of less than 0.05, marginally significant with 
a p-value greater than 0.05 but less than 0.10, or meet the inclusion criteria of having a 
critical ratio greater than 1.0.  The coefficient of determination (R2) for the endogenous 
variable service quality was relatively high, at 0.651, indicating a high degree of explanatory 
power.  R2 was greater than 0.30 for the other two endogenous variables, regulatory and 
statutory compliance and requirement definition sufficiency, indicating a moderate degree of 
explanatory power.  The models presented in this study are considered to be non-nested 
since several latent and manifest exogenous variables have been removed from the 
hypothesized model.  As such, it is appropriate to identify the best model through a 
comparison of AIC and BIC, which were obtained from the SEM output produced by Mplus 
Version 6.0.  The trimmed model presents lower values for both criteria and can, therefore, 
be considered the most preferred model of the two.  Overall, support was found for H2, H3, 
H6, H7, H12, H14, and H22.  A comparison of models is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Test of Hypotheses: Estimates of Structural Equations Model 






Compliance to Service Quality H1ac -.25 -3.41 -.24 -3.32 
Rqmt Definition to Service Quality  H2a .18 2.72 .17 2.61 
Rqmt Definition to Compliance H3b .15 1.94 .14 1.95 
Contractor defined rqmt to Service Quality H4 .03 .53   
Contractor defined rqmt to Rqmt Definition H5bc -.11 -1.88 -.11 -1.93 
Communication to Service Quality  H6a .93 11.77 .93 12.92 
Communication to Compliance H7a .58 6.96 .07 8.06 
Surveillance to Service Quality H8 .05 .89   
PBSA to Service Quality H9 -.04 -.83   
Lead Time to Service Quality H10ac -.20 -2.99 -.20 -3.01 
Lead Time to Compliance H11 -.03 -.34   
Lead Time to Rqmt Definition H12a .32 4.54 .30 4.38 
Personnel Turnover to Service Quality H13 .08 1.50 .08 1.51 
Personnel Turnover to Compliance H14b -.09 -1.60 -.10 -1.74 
Experience to Rqmt Definition  H15 .01 .15   
Experience to Compliance H16 .04 .54   
APDP Level to Rqmt Definition H17 .04 .59   
APDP Level to Compliance H18 -.07 -.93   
Education to Rqmt Definition H19 .03 .53   
Education to Compliance H20 .05 .90   
Internal Customer Commitment to 
Compliance 
H21 -.04 -.49   
Internal Customer Commitment to Rqmt 
Definition 
H22a .38 5.78 .06 5.92 
Notes. ap < 0.05, bp < 0.10; csignificant but inverse of hypothesis. 
The turnover of acquisition personnel did not seem to affect service quality.  To 
further analyze turnover, three modifications were applied to the turnover variable, RBV2, 
which represented percent turnover as a ratio of the number of times acquisition personnel 
had turned over to the number of acquisition personnel assigned.  First, an additional 
variable was created as a high/low binary variable, PTbin, where a cut in the data occurred 
at about the median (1.00).  Since the values of RBV2 are calculated as ratios, responses 
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were coded in PTbin with a value of one if the number of times that acquisition personnel 
turned over was greater than the median of 1.00 (n = 130).  All other responses were coded 
with a value of zero (n = 110).   
Next, the ratio of personnel turnover was modified to represent the annualized 
percent turnover (APT) by accounting for the duration of the contract.  Similar to the 
previous binary transformation, APT was also modified as a high/low binary variable where a 
cut in the data occurred about APT’s median (0.42). Within this new binary variable, APTbin, 
cases where APT was less than 42% were coded with a value of zero (n = 122), while cases 
where APT was greater than or equal to 42% were coded with a value of one (n = 118).   
We compared the means of service quality (SQ) and regulatory and statutory 
compliance (RSC) between the two groups, low percent turnover and high percent turnover, 
using MANOVA.  Test statistics for Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, and 
Roy’s Largest Root were statistically significant (p < .05).  These results indicate that there is 
a significant effect of the high/low percent turnover variable on service quality and regulatory 
and statutory compliance when the two dependent variables are considered as a group.  
These group differences were further explored using univariate F-tests.  There is a 
significant difference in the means between the two groups of RSC but no statistically 
significant difference in the means between the two groups of SQ.  As such, additional 
testing using a linear regression analysis of RSC on PTbin was appropriate to estimate the 
coefficient size and direction.  The resulting estimate was statistically significant with a 
standardized estimate of -0.18 (p < .01), indicating that compliance is less on those services 
acquisitions where acquisition personnel turnover is greater than or equal to 100%. 
Finally, we compared the means of SQ and RSC between the two groups, low 
annualized percent turnover and high annualized percent turnover, using MANOVA.  Test 
statistics for Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, and Roy’s Largest Root were 
statistically significant (p < .05).  These results indicate that there is a significant effect of the 
high/low annualized percent turnover variable on service quality and regulatory and statutory 
compliance when the two dependent variables are considered as a group.  The group 
differences were explored further using univariate F-tests.  There is a statistically significant 
difference in the means between the two groups of RSC but no statistically significant 
difference in the means between the two groups of SQ.  As such, additional testing using a 
linear regression analysis of RSC on PTbin was appropriate to estimate the coefficient size 
and direction.  The resulting estimate was statistically significant with a standardized 
estimate of -0.19 (p < .01), indicating that compliance is lesser on those services 
acquisitions where acquisition personnel turnover is greater than or equal to 42% annually. 
Further analysis was also performed to explore potential relationships between buyer 
experience and service quality, regulatory and statutory compliance, and requirement 
definition sufficiency.  This regression analysis resulted in the estimation of a statistically 
significant negative path coefficient (ȕ = -.13; t = -.201; p < .05) for the binary variable 
representing low buyer experience.  Therefore, it is concluded that low buyer experience (5 
years or less) is associated with lower levels of service quality. 
Discussion 
The objective of this research was to bridge a literature gap and to offer service 
contract practitioners a comprehensive model to better improve the acquisition of services 
while increasing compliance with acquisition regulations.  A structural equation model of the 
determinants of service contract outcomes was tested using data collected from 240 U.S. Air 
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Force contract administrators.  Many of the findings have significant implications for the 
government’s management of service acquisitions. 
We found a significant negative relationship between compliance and service quality; 
however, it was in the opposite direction than was anticipated.  As such, service quality and 
compliance with regulations and statutes are somewhat mutually exclusive.  Several 
potential explanations of this result are offered.  First, it is plausible that some of the 
regulations and statutes are successful at achieving public policy objectives but are 
detrimental to achieving the expected levels of service quality.  For example, competition 
requirements may force suppliers in highly competitive industries to lower the quantity or 
quality of service inputs to remain competitive in proposals, resulting in lower service levels.  
Additionally, if competition enables the selection of higher-performing suppliers, the act of 
compliance with extensive pre-solicitation policies, regulations, and statutes (e.g., 
excruciatingly thorough documented evaluations in order to defend a bid protest, and layers 
of internal reviews and approvals) may limit the time available for meaningful negotiations.  
Coopers and Lybrand (1994) found that compliance with regulations and statutes drives an 
18% cost premium to the DoD.  It is plausible that the true cost of compliance to the DoD 
also includes a premium on service quality. 
A second possibility exists that the actions necessary to achieve compliance with the 
numerous regulations and statutes directly reduce the contract administrator’s ability to 
adequately monitor and assess performance and to address deficiencies with the supplier.  
Compliance with labor law acts, such as the McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act or the 
Davis-Bacon Act, which require administrators to perform on-site interviews with contractor 
employees and review payrolls, may unduly limit the administrator’s available time to 
manage performance.   
Communication was supported as a determinant of service quality.  In fact, of all the 
antecedents explored, its effect sizes were the largest, making communication the most 
influential factor.   It is interesting that an aspect of relational exchange—communication—
has a greater effect on key service outcomes than do any transactional processes (e.g., 
requirements definition and supplier monitoring) or resources (e.g., procurement lead time). 
Minimizing procurement lead time is often an important goal of sourcing (Cavadias, 
2004).  Internal customers typically need their services quickly, and delays can be costly—
financially and politically.  The results show that accelerating a source selection decreases 
how well the buyer’s need is communicated to the supplier.  This, in turn, decreases service 
quality—as perceived by the buyer—because the buyer’s expectations are less likely to be 
met.  However, the results also showed that sufficient lead time directly decreases service 
quality.  This appears counter to the resource-based view of the firm if time is considered a 
resource.  However, having insufficient procurement lead time may also be an indicator of 
urgency.  If so, the results may indicate that buyers and suppliers rally around the buyer’s 
more urgent needs; consequently, service quality improves.  However, the finding that 
procurement lead time is associated with less buyer experience could also mean that less 
critical services that are not needed as rapidly are assigned to less experienced buyers.  
Thus, perhaps less attention is afforded to the requirement and the buyer’s source selection 
process is also less rigorous, directly decreasing service quality. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, transaction cost economic theory, and recent calls 
for improving the management of service procurements, increasing surveillance did not 
affect service quality.  It seems prudent, therefore, that sourcing leaders—rather than 
assigning more inspectors or increasing surveillance events—dedicate more resources to 
properly defining requirements and communicating with suppliers. 
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The findings from this investigation of service procurements have important 
implications for practitioners.  First, since the extent that a buyer’s requirement (need) is 
adequately defined affects the level of service quality received, buyers should commit the 
resources and effort to thoroughly communicate their performance expectations to suppliers. 
Sufficiently documenting requirements removes the human variability (Ellram et al., 2004) in 
expectations from skewing service quality evaluations.  This finding supports Ellram et al.’s 
(2007) recommendation to use concrete performance requirements.  Looking deeper, this 
finding also suggests that the buyer should retain some degree of proficiency in the 
outsourced service in order to be able to adequately define the requirement.  As a case in 
point, in 2008, the U.S. Navy delayed for one year the refurbishment of warheads because 
the National Nuclear Security Administration lost the requisite technical expertise (GAO, 
2009b). 
Second, the finding that communication was the strongest predictor of service quality 
is in stark contrast to the way procurement personnel are trained, educated, and developed.  
Rarely in their development are these valuable soft skills taught.  Perhaps more time should 
be devoted to the development and sustainment of relational norms such as communication, 
solidarity, mutuality, flexibility, reciprocity, trust, commitment, and harmonization of conflict.  
Clearly, acquisition leaders should assign effective communicators and relationship builders 
to manage service procurements. 
Allocating adequate procurement lead time appears to be important to achieving 
desired service quality—but only by improving the definition of the requirement.  Opposite to 
the expected outcome, lead time alone decreases service quality.  However, it could be 
attributed to services that are less important or to service procurements that are managed 
by less experienced buyers.  More research is needed to isolate why these opposing 
relationships exist.  What is clear is that sourcing managers should allocate more time to 
sourcing teams such that they can improve the definition of needs.  Ellram et al. (2007) 
recommended that resources be allocated commensurate with the importance of the spend.  
This study supports the importance of allocating sufficient lead time since it improves the 
definition of the buyer’s need.  In turn, service quality is increased. 
The results show that internal customers play a key role in reaping service quality 
from suppliers.  As the individual internal customer is more committed to a successful 
service procurement, the requirement will be better defined.  This, in turn, increases service 
quality.  Thus, leaders should assess the level of commitment of their employees, seek 
those who are passionate about their work, and assign committed employees to manage 
service contracts.  Employers can increase commitment by imposing positive and negative 
incentives linked to service contract outcomes.  Employees who are assigned to oversee 
service suppliers as an “additional duty” are not as likely to adequately define the buying 
organizations’ needs.  Furthermore, the manpower standards of internal customers may 
need to be reviewed to determine whether units are being adequately staffed to handle 
service contracts. 
Because compliance with regulations and statutes come at a price to service quality, 
acquisition leaders should revise or remove non-value added regulations and investigate 
which regulations and statutes are detrimental to acquisition outcomes.  Compliance with 
burdening requirements should be examined for either the allocations of more resources or 
for revision or relief.   
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Acquisition leaders should limit the turnover of acquisition personnel to no more than 
100% over the life of contracts and 42% annually.  Increased levels of turnover were found 
to be detrimental to compliance with regulations and statutes—particularly once turnover 
reaches critical thresholds of 100% over the life of the contract, or 42% annually.  At or 
above these levels, it seems that continuity is lost in the contract administration process and 
personnel are forced to focus resources away from compliance and toward other elements 
of administration in order to ensure an adequate level of performance.  Although a certain 
level of personnel turnover may be unavoidable due to deployments, retirements, and 
regular rotations, managers should avoid assigning temporary personnel to manage service 
acquisitions and, instead, should assign those personnel who the manager best anticipates 
retaining throughout the life of the contract. 
Agencies could integrate the service quality scale into a supplier performance-
evaluation system to routinely assess the performance of suppliers. Simpson, Siguaw, and 
White (2002) argued for the importance of regular feedback between buyers and suppliers.  
The DoD’s current method of rating performance—the contractor performance assessment 
reporting system (CPARS)—with few exceptions, only assesses performance annually and 
is more appropriate to inform source selection decisions than as a means of supplier 
improvement (Straight, 1999).  Furthermore, access to CPARS data is restricted, keeping 
key supply chain leaders in the dark.  Worse, the accuracy of the performance ratings is 
suspect—usually inflated—because suppliers are afforded an opportunity to rebut 
assessments and raters want to avoid the nontrivial effort required to resolve differences 
(GAO, 2009a).  This “watering down effect” will no doubt persist as suppliers continue to 
challenge performance assessments under the Contract Disputes Act (Graham, 2011).  
Clearly, an improved capability to manage supplier performance is needed. Periodic ratings 
could address these deficiencies and could also be used to rank-order suppliers based on 
performance, to segment services spend by high- and low-performing suppliers, and to 
assess the performance of individual buying activities. As such, rather than focusing on 
more oversight, agencies could focus directly on improving the performance of service 
suppliers and the ultimate quality of those services acquired. Finally, through the 
implementation of a supplier performance-evaluation system based on a service quality 
scale and of the electronic submittal and aggregation of ratings, agencies could regularly 
assess the quality of acquired services at an enterprise level. Such an assessment would 
allow for the identification of macro-level performance trends by service type or by top 
suppliers, or even allow for the evaluation of overall trends resulting from policy changes or 
external factors. 
Study Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study was not without limitations.  First, because the sample was comprised of 
U.S. Air Force personnel, the findings may not generalize to the DoD, other federal 
agencies, or the private sector.  This population could be extended in future research to 
other populations, such as another DoD Service, the DoD at-large, other federal agencies, 
or the for-profit sector.  Additionally, a convenience sample was used which may introduce 
bias.  Some degree of socially desirable response bias may be present for cases in which 
respondents were reluctant to tell the truth regarding sensitive or vulnerable areas (e.g., 
contract compliance).  Finally, as with all self-reported data, there is a potential for common 
method bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  Finally, future research could address the need to 
better measure variables that were measured in this study using single-item scales.  Future 
studies may either attempt to use a multiple-item scale to account for measurement error or 
assess these extents using objective measures. 
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